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ABSTRACT—Errors of commission are thought to be caused
by heavy memory loads, confusing information, lengthy
retention intervals, or some combination of these factors.
We report false memory beyond the boundaries of a view,
boundary extension, after less than 1/20th of a second.
Photographs of scenes were interrupted by a 42-ms or 250-
msmask, 250ms into viewing, before reappearing or being
replaced with a different view (Experiment 1). Postinter-
ruption photographs that were unchanged were rated as
closer up than the original views; when the photographs
were changed, the same pair of closer-up and wider-angle
views was rated as more similar when the closer view was
first, rather than second. Thus, observers remembered
preinterruption views with extended boundaries. Results
were replicated when the interruption included a saccade
(Experiment 2). The brevity of these interruptions has
implications for visual scanning; it also challenges the
traditional distinction between perception and memory.
We offer an alternative conceptualization that shows how
source monitoring can explain false memory after an in-
terruption briefer than an eyeblink.
Memory failure often involves errors of omission, but sometimes
involves errors of commission, in which one falsely remembers
details, words, or events that were not actually experienced.
Errors of commission are generally associated with the pre-
sentation of confusing information (e.g., the misinformation ef-
fect; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) or with heavy memory loads
and the passage of time (Bartlett, 1932; Koriat, Goldsmith, &
Pansky, 2000). It is generally accepted that as memory fades,
representations become less veridical and increasingly prone to
biases based on preexisting knowledge. In some cases, however,
errors of commission have been found to occur very rapidly. One
such example comes from research on boundary extension (In-
traub, Gottesman, Willey, & Zuk, 1996).
Boundary extension is a constructive error in scene repre-
sentation; observers remember having seen beyond the edges of
a view. Figure 1 shows examples of participants’ drawings from
memory of a multiobject scene (left) and a simple, single-object
scene (right). In both cases, the remembered representation
‘‘overflowed’’ the physical boundaries of the view, anticipating
upcoming layout in the world. Boundary extension is specifically
related to memory for views of scenes. It does not occur when an
object is presented without a scenic structure (e.g., objects on
blank backgrounds; Gottesman & Intraub, 2002; Intraub, Got-
tesman, & Bills, 1998). It is associated with selective neuronal
responses in brain areas related to scene representation: the
parahippocampal place area and retrosplenial cortex (Park,
Intraub, Yi, Widders, & Chun, 2007). It has been observed
across the life span: in children and adults (ages 6–87 years;
Seamon, Schlegel, Hiester, Landau, & Blumenthal, 2002) and in
infants (ages 3–4 months; Quinn & Intraub, 2007).
Although most research on boundary extension has focused on
relatively long-term memory (as in the examples in Fig. 1), a few
studies have tested very short-term retention. In a rapid serial
visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm, boundary extension oc-
curred when the retention interval was as brief as 1 s (Bertamini,
Jones, Spooner, & Hecht, 2005; Intraub et al., 1996). In response
to the rapidity with which this error occurs, Roediger (1996)
proposed that although boundary extension is evident after the
picture is gone (i.e., in memory), it may actually take place while
the picture is being processed and understood (in some sense
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perceived), thus falling at a point not clearly defined as either
perception or memory. This contention is an important one, but,
although a 1-s retention interval is surprisingly brief for a con-
structive memory error, it is a fairly long interval given the ra-
pidity of scene comprehension, which is thought to occur within
150 ms or less (Potter, 1976; Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996).
What if memory for a scene were disrupted not for 1 s, but for
the fleeting duration of an eye movement (a saccade)—on the
order of 30 to 50 ms (Rayner, 1998)? Although it seems unlikely
that computation of extrapolated layout beyond the boundaries
could occur this quickly, if it did, it would raise important
questions about the nature of scene representation during visual
scanning, and the potentially adaptive role such errors might
play. This brings us back to Roediger’s (1996) point about the
perception-memory divide, because it is important to recognize
that visual scanning itself defies ready placement on either side
of this theoretical boundary. This is because one can never see
the surrounding world all at once and must sample it through
movements of the head and eyes. In so doing, one is forced to
toggle back and forth between the visuo-sensory input and
memory because each eye fixation is followed by a saccade
during which vision is suppressed until onset of the next fixation
(Volkmann, 1986). For the fleeting duration of that saccade, the
visual system must rely on memory: a short-lived transsaccadic
memory (Irwin, 1991, 1993) and a long-term representation that
accrues information across fixations (Hollingworth & Hender-
son, 2002). Might boundary extension (a constructive memory
error) occur rapidly enough to be available in transsaccadic
memory?
THE PRESENT STUDY
In the experiments reported here, on each trial a single view of a
new scene was presented for 250 ms (a ‘‘fixation’s worth’’). This
Fig. 1. Examples of boundary extension from previous experiments: close-up views (top row),
participants’ drawings of these views from memory (middle row), and wide-angle views of the same
scenes (bottom row). Note that boundary extension (remembering layout beyond the given view)
occurred both for multiobject scenes in which the main objects were cropped by view boundaries (as
shown on the left) and for single-object scenes with no cropping of the object (as shown on the right);
observers simply remembered seeing more of the world than was shown. (The illustrations on the left
are based on Intraub & Richardson, 1989, Fig. 1; the illustrations on the right are based on Intraub,
Gottesman, Willey, & Zuk, 1996, Fig. 1.)
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view was then briefly disrupted before either the identical view
or a slightly different view (a more close-up or a wider-angle
view) appeared at test. In Experiment 1, the disruption (caused
by the onset of a mask) lasted for the duration of a saccade (42
ms) or for a longer duration that approximated the time from the
onset of one fixation to the onset of the next (250 ms); our goal
was to determine if memory in either case would be prone to
boundary extension. In Experiment 2, the disruption included
an actual saccade. Observers used a 5-point scale to rate the test
view as being ‘‘the same’’ as, ‘‘more close up’’ than, or ‘‘more
wide angle’’ than the original stimulus. There were four trial
types, defined by the combination of stimulus and test views:
close-up stimulus, close-up test picture (CC); wide-angle stim-
ulus, wide-angle test picture (WW); close-up stimulus, wide-
angle test picture (CW); and wide-angle stimulus, close-up test
picture (WC).
Surely one would expect observers to recognize the same view
when the briefer (42-ms)mask was used, because in this case the
disruption lasted less than 1/20th of a second. In physiological
terms, such an interruption amounts to less than one eighth of
the time taken by a spontaneous eyeblink (VanderWerf, Bras-
singa, Reits, Aramideh,&deVisser, 2003). However, if boundary
extension ‘‘intervened,’’ the errors that occurred would follow a
specific diagnostic pattern:
1. Identical close-up views (CC): When stimulus and test pic-
tures are identical close-up views, the test picture should be
rated as more ‘‘close up’’ than the stimulus, which would
indicate that the original view is remembered with extended
boundaries.
2. Identical close-up views (CC) versus identical wider-angle
views (WW): Identical close-up views tend to yield more
boundary extension than identical wider-angle views. In fact,
wider views often yield little or no directional error (Intraub,
Bender, & Mangels, 1992; also see Bertamini et al., 2005).
3. Different views (CWand WC): When stimulus and test views
do not match, a rating asymmetry should be observed.
Boundary extension for the stimulus on CW trials would
result in a mental representation that closely approximates
the test item. In contrast, any extension of the stimulus on
WC trials would exaggerate the difference between the
stimulus and test views. Thus, the same pair of close and





Two versions of 36 digital photographs of people, animals, and
landscapes were created. Background complexity ranged from
fields of grass to audience-filled bleachers. Close-up versions
were made by enlarging wider-angle views 8% to 21% and
cropping the pictures to their original size (using Adobe Pho-
toshop). Thus, the views within a given pair were the same size,
but the wider view revealed more of the background, and the
objects covered less area (see Fig. 2).
Stimuli were presented on a 21-in. flat-screen CRT monitor
(32-bit color, resolution of 1024 768 pixels) run by a Pentium-
based PC (Microsoft Windows XP operating system, 128
megabytes of video memory). Software written in C was based on
an SR Research Ltd. (Mississauga, Ontario, Canada) template
program and used Simple DirectMedia Layer (SDL; http://
www.libsdl.org). Viewing distance was approximately 80 cm.
Aspect ratios varied across the scenes; on average, pictures
subtended 9.21 10.21 of visual angle (widths ranged from 5.91
to 13.71; heights ranged from 8.91 to 10.41).
Participants and Procedure
Seventy-two University of Delaware undergraduates (42 female,
30 male) participating in the general-psychology subject pool
were randomly assigned to either the 42-ms-mask or the 250-
ms-mask condition. All four trial types (CC, WW, WC, and CW)
were randomly intermixed in each condition, with the constraint
that no more than three trials of the same type could appear
in a row.
On each of the 36 trials, participants fixated a yellow cross,
which was followed by the stimulus (either the close-up or the
wider-angle version of one scene). The stimulus was presented
for 250 ms before being replaced by a mask (for 42 or 250 ms,
Fig. 2. A sample pair of stimuli. Note that when these pictures are side
by side, as in this figure, the differences between the pictures may not be
salient. However, if the pictures are shown in succession in the same
spatial location with no mask (so that motion effects are allowed), the
difference between them is highly salient; the wider-angle view reveals
more of the scene, and the area of the main object decreases by 27.6% in
that view relative to the close-up view. This image was taken from the Big
Box of Art 615,000 Images database, Hemera Technologies (Gatineau,
Quebec, Canada), and is in the public domain.
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depending on the condition). The mask was dynamic (a black-
and-white pattern mask with a 5.51  5.51 circular ‘‘face,’’
similar to a ‘‘happy face,’’ that appeared in the center and
changed every 150 ms; see Dickinson & Intraub, 2008). Thus,
one central face appeared in the 42-ms condition, and two faces
appeared in the 250-ms condition. This dynamic mask was in-
tended to enhance maintenance of central fixation and to pre-
vent participants from verbally describing the locations of the
picture boundaries. The test picture (identical or alternate view)
immediately followed themask and remained on the screen until
participants rated it relative to the stimulus. Response options
were as follows: The camera’s position was ‘‘much closer up
(2),’’ ‘‘a little closer up (1),’’ ‘‘the same (0),’’ ‘‘a little farther
away (1),’’ or ‘‘much farther away (2).’’ Participants then entered
a confidence rating: ‘‘sure (3),’’ ‘‘pretty sure (2),’’ or ‘‘not sure
(1).’’ On 2% of the 42-ms trials and 0% of the 250-ms trials,
observers selected a ‘‘missed the picture’’ option (e.g., because
of blinking) in lieu of the confidence rating; these trials were
excluded from analysis. The experiment always began with 2
practice trials.
Results and Discussion
Boundary extension occurred for both the 250-ms and the 42-ms
retention intervals. All three rating patterns diagnostic of
boundary extension were obtained, and ratings fell within the
range observed in prior experiments using the same rating scale
(e.g., Dickinson & Intraub, 2008). Figure 3 shows the mean
rating for each trial type at each retention interval. As the figure
shows, CC trials yielded significant boundary extension (d 5
0.96 and d 5 0.78 in the 42-ms and 250-ms CC conditions,
respectively), and WW trials yielded little or none (depending
on condition). As in prior research, boundary extension on CC
trials could not be attributed to extreme boundary-extension
errors for a small subset of the pictures; 78% of the pictures on
CC trials received mean ratings consistent with boundary ex-
tension. A 2 (retention interval: 42 ms, 250 ms)  2 (trial type:
CC, WW) analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed greater
boundary extension on CC trials than on WW trials, F(1, 70)5
16.32, p < .001, Zp
2 ¼ :19; no effect of retention interval, F(1,
70) 5 2.10, p 5 .15; and no interaction, F < 1.
Observers were clearly on task. As Figure 3 shows, they were
able to recognize CW and WC trials, correctly rating the test
items as being more close-up or more wide-angle than the
stimulus pictures. The mean ratings, however, revealed the
critical asymmetry diagnostic of boundary extension. The
difference between the mean rating and 0 (‘‘same’’) was smaller
on CW trials than on WC trials. A 2 (retention interval: 42 ms,
250 ms)  2 (trial type: CW, WC) ANOVA showed that the ab-
solute values of the mean ratings differed significantly between
the two trial types, F(1, 70)5 65.17, p< .001, Zp
2 ¼ :48 (main
effect of trial type); there was no effect of retention interval, F(1,
70) 5 1.84, p 5 .18, and no interaction, F < 1.
Overall, responses to repeated views showed that a 42-ms
interruption of sensory input not only resulted in boundary
extension, but also led to mean boundary scores that were
similar to those obtained after a much longer (250-ms) inter-
ruption. Mean confidence ratings for the two conditions
Fig. 3. Mean boundary ratings for each trial type in the 42-ms and 250-ms conditions of Experiment
1. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval around each mean. The four trial types are defined
by the combination of stimulus and test pictures: close-up stimulus, close-up test picture (CC); wide-
angle stimulus, wide-angle test picture (WW); close-up stimulus, wide-angle test picture (CW); and
wide-angle stimulus, close-up test picture (WC). The rating scale ranged from 2, which indicated
that the test picture was ‘‘much closer up’’ than the stimulus picture, to12, which indicated that the
test picture was ‘‘much farther away’’ than the stimulus picture. A rating of 0 indicated the stimulus
and test picture looked ‘‘the same.’’ On CC and WW trials, a negative mean rating significantly less
than 0 (i.e., 0 falls outside the confidence interval) indicates boundary extension; on CW and WC
trials, a mean rating that differs significantly from 0 indicates that observers correctly recognized
that the pictures differed. Asymmetric mean ratings on CWand WC trials (CW mean ratings closer
to 0) also indicate boundary extension.
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both centered on ‘‘pretty sure’’ and did not differ (1.98 vs. 2.08
for the 42-ms vs. 250-ms conditions, respectively), t(70)5 1.22,
p 5 .22.
These results were surprising. Although observers knew
precisely what would be tested on each trial, and were required
simply to maintain fixation, a disruption lasting less than 1/20th
of a second was sufficient for boundary extension to occur. Next,
we asked if the same outcome would hold if an actual saccade
was made between the first and second presentations of the
scene.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 1, although the 42-ms condition mimicked a
saccade, the task demands were minimal relative to those re-
quired by an actual eye movement. In Experiment 2, stimulus
and test locations were on different sides of the screen, requiring
a saccade, and the test picture did not appear until the eyes
moved into the test region. Thus, the stimulus had to be main-
tained in memory while attention shifted rapidly to the new lo-
cation (e.g., Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995; Kowler, Anderson,
Dosher, & Blaser, 1995) and an eye movement was planned and
executed. If these greater demands compromise a presumably
fragile transsaccadic memory, then observers might make ran-
dom errors, instead of exhibiting boundary extension. This
would be evidence against the existence of boundary extension
during visual scanning, suggesting instead that it rapidly occurs
only under the extremely simplified conditions used in Exper-
iment 1. In contrast, replication of Experiment 1 would indicate
that the transsaccadic representation can include boundary
extension, and thus that this anticipatory spatial representation
is available to play a role in the integration of successive views.
Method
Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate volunteers (21 female, 11 male) from
the same population as in Experiment 1 participated.
Stimuli and Procedure
The stimuli and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1
except that (a) stimuli appeared on one side of the screen and
test pictures on the other, requiring a gaze shift (for half the
participants, the stimulus was on the left; for the others, it was on
the right); (b) the dynamic portion of the mask appeared in the
center of the test region (serving as the saccade target); and (c)
the test picture appeared when the participant’s eyes crossed
into the test region. Thus, the test picture was present when the
eyes landed. The center-to-center distance between stimulus
and test pictures ranged from 8.41 to 14.21 (M 5 11.81). Test
procedures were the same as in Experiment 1. Trials on which
participants executed more than a single saccade were excluded
from analysis (39% of all trials).
Apparatus
The apparatus was unchanged except for the addition of an
EyeLink II head-mounted video eye-tracking system (SR Re-
search Ltd., Mississauga, Ontario, Canada) that was used to
monitor eye movements and control onset of the gaze-contingent
test item. Eye position was sampled at 500 Hz, the system’s
spatial resolution was estimated to be less than 0.41, and head
position and viewing distance were fixed with a chin rest.
Results and Discussion
Boundary extension occurred; all three diagnostic rating pat-
terns were obtained. Figure 4 shows the mean rating for each
trial type. As the figure shows, the CC condition yielded
boundary extension (d 5 0.85), and the WW condition yielded
no directional error; mean ratings were greater on CC trials than
onWW trials, t(31)5 2.49, p5 .018, d5 0.56. Again, the mean
CC rating reflected a boundary-extension error for a majority of
the pictures (64%). OnWC and CW trials, participants correctly
detected the change, but as before, their mean ratings revealed
the critical asymmetry diagnostic of boundary extension;
Fig. 4. Mean boundary rating for each trial type following a single sac-
cade between stimulus and test (Experiment 2). Error bars show the 95%
confidence interval around each mean. The four trial types are defined by
the combination of stimulus and test pictures: close-up stimulus, close-up
test picture (CC); wide-angle stimulus, wide-angle test picture (WW);
close-up stimulus, wide-angle test picture (CW); and wide-angle stimulus,
close-up test picture (WC). The rating scale ranged from 2, which in-
dicated that the test picture was ‘‘much closer up’’ than the stimulus
picture, to 12, which indicated that the test picture was ‘‘much farther
away’’ than the stimulus picture. A rating of 0 indicated the stimulus and
test picture looked ‘‘the same.’’ On CC and WW trials, a negative mean
rating significantly less than 0 (i.e., 0 falls outside the confidence interval)
indicates boundary extension; on CW and WC trials, a mean rating that
differs significantly from 0 indicates that observers correctly recognized
that the pictures differed. Asymmetric mean ratings on CWandWC trials
(CW mean ratings closer to 0) also indicate boundary extension.
Volume 19—Number 10 1011
Helene Intraub and Christopher A. Dickinson
deviation from 0 (‘‘same’’) was significantly smaller for CW than
for WC trials, t(31) 5 2.87, p 5 .007, d 5 0.80. The mean
confidence rating across trials was 2.1 (‘‘pretty sure’’).
Eye movement data showed that observers followed instruc-
tions and rapidly shifted their gaze to the test area following
stimulus offset. Mean saccade latency (from stimulus offset) was
258 ms, and mean saccade duration was 54 ms; thus, the re-
tention interval was, on average, 312ms. Although disruption by
a mask and a saccade provided a more demanding situation than
in Experiment 1, robust boundary extension occurred.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Boundary extension, an error of commission, occurs extraordi-
narily rapidly. Observers remembered having seen the contin-
uation of the view beyond its physical boundaries when the
sensory input was disrupted for less than 1/20th of a second!
They remembered having seen more of the scene than was
shown. The rapid onset of this false-memory effect has impli-
cations for theories of scene perception. In addition, it chal-
lenges the traditionally held division between perception and
memory. We discuss each topic in turn.
Scene Representation
These experiments show that scene representation is already
extended by the time the observer compares one view with the
next. Experiment 1 showed that when a single view of a scene
was interrupted by a mask for a fleeting duration equal to the
duration of a saccade (42-ms-mask condition), although the view
had not changed, participants thought it showed less of the scene
than before (i.e., a more close-up view). Conditions in which the
closer version was followed by the wider-angle version or vice
versa yielded the critical response asymmetry diagnostic of
boundary extension, thus supporting the same conclusion. Ex-
periment 2 showed that the boundary-extended representation
was robust enough to survive a shift in spatial attention and the
implementation of a saccade.
Because memory had to be tested immediately following a
single fixation, none of the conditions could include free view-
ing. Is it plausible that boundary extension might occur on-line
during visual scanning? We suggest that it is because these
experiments ‘‘bracket’’ the normal viewing situation. Experi-
ment 1 was less demanding because observers simply had to
maintain their gaze and attend to a single location on each trial;
Experiment 2 was more demanding because observers had to
consciously shift their gaze to a new location in response to a cue
while holding the first view in memory. Yet robust boundary
extension occurred in both cases. Further support comes from
other research in which comparable results were obtained when
we embedded the stimulus in an RSVP sequence, thus capturing
some of the dynamic changes inherent in visual scanning
(Dickinson & Intraub, 2008).
We argue that rather than being disruptive, boundary errors
during visual scanning are more likely to have a positive impact
on scene perception. This is because the ‘‘goal’’ of the system is
to provide a coherent representation of the world—not a record
of the spurious boundaries of each individual view. Anticipatory
representation of the continuation of layout beyond view
boundaries may serve to ‘‘fill in’’ gaps during scanning, and
perhaps prime soon-to-be-visible layout (Sanocki, 2003). Thus,
boundary extension could serve to facilitate integration of suc-
cessive views into a coherent representation (Intraub, 1997).
The surprising rapidity of the error, however, poses a challenge
for the traditionally held division between perception and
memory.
Perception Versus Memory
The traditional information-processing approach to perception
begins with a representation of the stimulus. If there is no mask,
a veridical sensory representationmay be brieflymaintained in a
sensory register (Sperling, 1960); otherwise, aspects of the
(previously veridical) representation will be directly processed
in one or more very short-lived memory stores (e.g., transsaccadic
memory—Irwin, 1991, 1993; conceptual short-term store—
Potter, 1976; visual short-term memory—Phillips, 1974).
Memory in these stores is not ‘‘picture perfect.’’ Indeed, consid-
erable research has focused on the paucity of the representation
during this time (e.g., change blindness; Simons & Rensink,
2005). If attention ismaintained, however, ultimately these briefly
stored aspects of the view will be consolidated in long-term
memory.
At what point in this process would boundary extension take
place? Given this framework, we would have to postulate that it
would begin after the (veridical) sensory input is gone, but be
completed rapidly enough to influence assessment of the next
view. Considering that the briefest interruption in Experiments 1
and 2 was a mask lasting only 42 ms, the processes responsible
for boundary extension would have to rapidly unfold in one of
these early buffers. Perhaps this is what happens, but the timing
seems prohibitively brief. Equally important, the cause of this
boundary extension is left unspecified—an ad hoc ‘‘extrapola-
tion process’’ must be invoked to explain it.
We offer an alternative conceptualization that we believe
provides a more parsimonious account of rapid boundary ex-
tension. Whereas the traditional approach begins with a repre-
sentation of the visual sensory information, consider instead the
possibility that the ensuing perceptual representation is not
derived from a single source (sensory input), but simultaneously
draws on at least two other sources of input related to scene
structure. Both are internally generated (i.e., top-down).
One of these additional sources of input is amodal perception,
which is instituted in response to occlusion of the world at the
view boundaries (Gottesman & Intraub, 2003). Amodal pro-
cesses (thus named because they draw on no sensory modality)
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‘‘fill out’’ the occluded portions of objects (object completion;
Kanizsa, 1979) and the continuity of surface textures (Kellman,
Yin, & Shipley, 1998; Nakayama, He, & Shimojo, 1995). This is
a critical aspect of everyday perception. The amodally gener-
ated layout beyond the view boundaries in our example would be
a tightly constrained continuation of the visible content at the
periphery of the view. The other source of information is purely
spatial, carrying no specific information about the scene. This
spatial framework would provide the observer with a sense of the
space beyond the left, right, top, and bottom boundaries of the
view (Attneave & Farrar, 1977; Franklin & Tversky, 1990). All
views, after all, reveal only part of an otherwise continuous
world.
Thus, we propose that scene perception has multiple sources:
sensory, amodal, and spatial (and likely others, e.g., semantic
knowledge). During the first fixation, while the stimulus is vis-
ible, mental representation would parallel the sensory input.
Resolution would be highest at the point of fixation (foveal vi-
sion), decrease for information falling farther in the periphery,
and decrease again for the amodal region; finally, at the point
where only the general spatial framework is available, no further
detail could be resolved without shifting gaze (or in a photo-
graph, shifting the camera’s viewpoint).
The boundary error does not occur while the stimulus is
present, because the difference between currently active sensory
information in the periphery and top-down amodal information is
readily discernible. However, when the sensory input is inter-
rupted, this changes. The mental representation is available, but
no longer has the contribution of a sensory source. There are no
‘‘tags’’ to specify the exact point at which peripheral information
was originally derived via low-acuity peripheral vision or highly
constrained amodal perception, although both provide a level of
detail unavailable in the spatial structure falling beyond them.
Thus, at test, when the observer must distinguish which portion
of a multisource scene representation was ‘‘seen before’’ (i.e.,
derived from the visual sensory input alone), some of the infor-
mation originally generated by amodal processing is misattrib-
uted to sensory perception, causing boundary extension.
In contrast to the traditional conceptualization, this account
does not propose that the extended region is constructed after
the view is gone (i.e., when the observer’s experience shifts from
‘‘veridical perception’’ to ‘‘faulty memory’’). Instead, the ex-
tended region was already part of the representation (albeit,
an amodally generated part) while the sensory input was avail-
able. Thus, there is no need to propose activation of an extrap-
olation process following stimulus offset. Instead, boundary
extension is the result of a source-monitoring error (Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993)—specifically, a reality-monitor-
ing error (Johnson & Raye, 1981), because the test requires the
observer to distinguish between externally generated informa-
tion (visual perception of the sensory input) and internally
generated information (amodal perception just beyond the edges
of the view).
A key insight expressed in the source-monitoring model is
that the source of amemory is an attribution based on the amount
and quality of details (perceptual, contextual, semantic, or
emotional) in the representation (Johnson, 2006; Johnson et al.,
1993). This model can explain highly detailed false memories
(e.g., memories for events that one did not experience, but heard
other people describe, or that were dreamed), as well as more
mundane mental puzzles (‘‘Did I actually turn off the stove be-
fore we left, or did I just think about it?’’). For example, if
memory for a dream includes highly specific perceptual details
(a hallmark of memories based on sensory experience), one may
err in attributing the source of the memory to perception. We
propose that the same ideas are applicable to memory tested
following an interruption briefer than an eyeblink, and can ac-
count for false memory beyond the boundaries of a view.
CONCLUSIONS
Boundary extension (an error of commission) occurs extremely
rapidly; observers erred when sensory input was interrupted for
less than 1/20th of a second. If one thinks of perception as in-
corporating information from multiple sources (sensory, amodal,
and spatial) simultaneously, instead of drawing on the visual
sensory input alone, one can then explain rapid boundary ex-
tension without appealing to an ad hoc extrapolation process.
Instead, the same principles that underlie source monitoring in
long-term memory can be applied to a situation in which one
falsely remembers having seen more of a scene than was shown.
The rapidity of this error would be advantageous rather than
harmful, because the goal of the visual system is not to represent
the spurious boundaries of each fleeting view, but to incorporate
those views into a coherent, continuous representation of a
surrounding world.
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